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Absolutism and Fiscal Transparency
in Eighteenth-Century Spain
Rafael TORRES SÁNCHEZ*
Abstract. Studies of the public management of taxation and ýnance matters have tended
to focus on legislation and the political structure. There would nonetheless seem to be
a glaring difference between state intentions and actual practice. Our objective here is
to assess the gap between political rhetoric and actual policy enforcement. Looking at a
speciýc tax hike in the second half of the eighteenth century in Spain, we examine the
arguments used and facts hushed up to justify the change, investigate how the political
regime might constrain these arguments and, ýnally, how the information given on the
whole process was manipulated to woo over the taxpayers. We argue that legislation
was by no means synonymous with actual enforcement of policies precisely because it
had to be communicated to society.
Keywords. Fiscal Policy, Fiscal Transparency, Taxation, Public Finances, Warfare,
Charles III
Résumé. Absolutisme et transparence þscale dans l’Espagne du XVIIIe siècle. Les
études historiques consacrées à l’administration ýscale et ýnancière ont tendance à se
concentrer sur la législation et les structures politiques. Il existe cependant une différence
þagrante entre les intentions de l’État et leur mise en pratique. Notre objectif ici est
d’évaluer l’écart entre la rhétorique politique et l’action ýnancière. L’augmentation d’une
taxe spéciýque dans l’Espagne de la seconde moitié du XVIIIe siècle permet d’examiner
les arguments utilisés par le gouvernement et les faits qui étaient tus aýn de justiýer
l’innovation ýscale. Elle permet également d’enquêter sur la façon dont le régime aurait
utilisé ces arguments et, enýn, d’observer comment l’information divulguée sur ce
processus a été manipulée aýn de gagner l’appui des contribuables. Au ýnal, il nous
semble que la législation ýscale n’était nullement synonyme d’une mise en œuvre,
précisément parce qu’elle devait être communiquée à la société.
Mots-clés. Politique budgétaire, transparence ýscale, impôts, ýnances publiques,
guerre, Charles III
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Why should an absolutist state worry about ýscal transparency? Why
should an absolutist state be interested in getting its taxation policy across
to the taxpayers? Was any sort of control mechanism wielded over its
taxation policy? Historians have tended to answer these questions in terms
of state construction. A simplistic dichotomy between parliamentary states
and absolutist states has led many historians to rule out the very possibility
of any absolutist state worrying about ýscal transparency. In theory an
absolutist state had no curb, control or institutional restriction whatsoever to
the enforcement of its taxation policy. Precisely because of this unlimited
capacity of ýscal action it had no need either to explain its taxation policy to
taxpayers. More recently it has been argued that the will of a state alone was
not enough in itself to bring in signiýcant tax changes. The work of Patrick
O’Brien or Stephen Conway, for example, has shown that it was necessary
to involve taxpayers in the taxation policy. As the English example shows,
a certain consensus between state and taxpayers about the advantage of any
ýscal change, whether in terms of protection or opportunities, was essential.
According to this new way of looking at the relationship between
the political regime and taxation policy, and as Joël Félix has shown for
mid-eighteenth century France, the absolutist state also stood in need of
a consensus, but a different sort of consensus. Today it is argued that the
absolutist state would seek consensus only with the revenue-collecting
middle men. This would be a limited consensus, involving pacts with
speciýc groups (whether public institutions or private groups). An absolutist
state, therefore, would still not need to communicate its taxation policy
changes to taxpayers themselves. Since there was no type of communication
or taxpayer involvement in the taxation policy, the consequence would be
that taxpayers of absolutist states would systematically oppose any change
in the taxation policy. Absence of ýscal transparency, therefore, was a sine
qua non of understanding taxation policy in absolutist states.
Does this hold true for all ýscal states? Let’s look at the example of
eighteenth-century Spain, clearly an absolutist state. And let’s ask the same
question: did the Spanish absolutist state have any need of explaining to
its taxpayers the reasons behind its taxation policy? Did the Spanish state
have any type of concern or sensitivity about the reaction of its taxpayers?
In other words, did the Spanish absolutist state practice any type of ýscal
transparency?
We have addressed this problem by analysing an extreme case:
the moment of the biggest eighteenth-century hike of the Spanish Real
Hacienda’s most important source of inland revenue. In November 1779
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the Spanish government decreed a tax increase to defray the war that
broke out against Great Britain in June of the same year. In the opinion of
Miguel Artola, “the most convenient option was taken”, upping by one third
the amount the state received from Rentas Provinciales y Equivalentes
(provincial consumer taxes in Castile and equivalent taxes in other
regions).1 Artola argues that it would seem perfectly logical for the state
to ýnance warfare expenditure by raising taxes and that the state found it
easy to do so by means of a 33.3% rate hike. Artola regarded this as easy
to understand. After all, we are dealing here with an absolute state that can
pursue the arbitrary policy it wishes; i.e., tweak state revenue as much as
it liked whenever it deemed ýtting to do so. War was more than enough
reason, Artola implicitly sustains, for the state’s absolutist ýscal policy to
show its true colours. Artola undoubtedly sees this despotic tax hike as a
clear example of arbitrariness underpinned by the absolutist model.
To assume that Charles III’s state could raise tax rates when and how it
wished is to accept that the Bourbons pursued a policy of ýscal absolutism,
or at least were in a position to do so. The aim of this article is precisely to
plumb the truth of this hypothesis, i.e., to ýnd out whether or not Charles III’s
government could really afford to give free rein to this ýscal absolutism. It
seems timely to ask this question now because Artola’s thesis has recently
come under ýre on two grounds: ýrstly the degree of arbitrariness allowed
by absolutism and secondly the ease with which an absolute government
could raise tax rates.
First and foremost there is a growing number of historians who shed
doubt on this knee-jerk equation of absolute governments, like Charles III’s,
and the untrammelled free will to change tax systems and rates. As
Hoffman and Norberg conclude, with the French case in mind: “taxation
and despotism were, in the last analysis, incompatible”.2 It would seem to
be clear by now that the problem was not the political model, or at least not
alone. The discovery that absolute states in fact had more difýculty than
parliamentary states in changing their taxation policy has opened up an
interesting debate about why precisely the non-absolutist states like Great
Britain or the Netherlands were able to modify and mobilise their taxation
resources far more successfully.3 As things currently stand in this ongoing
research, everything seems to indicate that, rather than strictly a question of
1. M. ARTOLA, 1982, p. 330.
2. P. HOFFMAN & K. NORBERG, 1994, p. 306.
3. M.DINCECCO, 2009, p. 48-103. The comparison with the Spanish case is essential:
R. TORRES, 2015.
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the political regime, what really mattered was the lower degree of opposition
to taxation changes in non-absolute states. The differences between states
seem to reside above all in the levels of political and economic elites, both
local and national.4 Non-absolute states, in other words, might pursue a
ýscal policy just as arbitrary as an absolute state, but its enforcement came
up against much less social opposition and was even helped by an open and
self-interested enforcement participation and consensus from the elites.5
Limits to the taxation policy, therefore, did not lie so much in any country’s
particular constitutional structure but more so in the groups sustaining
political power, legalising the ýscal-change measures and expediting their
enforcement or even directly promoting and participating in them.6 To
put it in a nutshell, therefore, the important point about Charles III’s ýscal
absolutism was not whether or not it was arbitrary but whether or not it
could be effectively enforced.
Secondly, the idea of “convenience” attributed byArtola to thiswarfare-
ýnancing tax hike has also been brought under the spotlight of recent
historical research and found wanting. To start with there is now a certain
consensus that taxation was not the most efýcient warfare-ýnancing method
in the eighteenth century.7 In the English case, which has been most closely
studied, this option was taken up early, but even in France the government
was unable to fall back on tax revenue to affront the conþict. As Richard
Bonney argues, past experience had taught the French government (but any
other European state might have plausibly learnt the same lesson), that the
new taxes would not rake in enough money quick enough to ýnance a war.8
The only way to change this situation would have been to steal a march
on events by changing the taxation policy before the war, but diplomatic
watchdogs would have seen any such move as a formal declaration of
war.9 Any wartime tax hike would have served, at best, for helping to pay
off wartime-contracted debts afterwards. The warfare-ýnancing tax hike
decreed by Charles III cannot be seen as an isolated and almost automatic
measure. To understand its real nature it needs to be studied in the historical
4. As argued by J. GLETE, 2007, p. 87-108. The origin of this thesis can be found in
R. LACHMAN, 2000.
5. This thesis is well explained in P. K. O’BRIEN, 2011, p. 408-446.
6. This is borne out by analysing the taxation changes bound up with the creation of
public debt, where consensus of the participants in the creation and sustaining thereof was
essential. This is the thesis of D. STASAVAGE, 2003.
7. T.J.A. LE GOFF, 1999, p. 377-413. See the comments on this issue in S. CONWAY &
R. TORRES, 2011, p. 9-30.
8. R. BONNEY, 2004, p. 191-215.
9. J. FÉLIX, 2006, p. 42.
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context in which it was effectively agreed and enforced. Neither can this tax
hike be written off as a convenient measure. Consideration has to be given
to such factors as the real revenue-raising calculations of the authorities,
which we can check against its enforcement, its efýcacy in raising this
calculated sum, the speed and the methods put into practice. The fact that
there was an order to raise tax rates, in other words, cannot stand alone as
an explanation of that taxation policy. We need also to factor in the design of
the taxation change, how this tax hike was actually enforced and what were
the consequences of the measure. Studying a particular taxation change
from the moment it was decided upon to the moment it was enforced and
the revenue received can give us some revealing insights into the true nature
of Charles III’s absolutism.10
1. The delay in bringing in the tax hike
Despite the arbitrary authority implicitly and explicitly attributed by
Artola to Charles III’s government, those in charge of his taxation policy
were much less sure of their ground. After the end of the war the Secretario
de Estado himself, Conde de Floridablanca, with the recent experience of
having implemented the biggest ýscal change of his government, wrote
that “the operation of increasing or changing taxes […] is one of the most
serious, most difýcult and riskiest measures that might be taken within
this vast monarchy of ours”.11 For the head of Charles III’s government the
decision to tamper with a tax was no triþing matter; in no way was it easy
and convenient and, judging from his own words, needed to be approached
with the utmost caution.
As a result of this mindset, raising taxes was by no means the ýrst-
resort for Charles III’s government. In 1779 the order went out for a Junta
de Medios (Resources Board) to be set up, with the remit of proposing
resources for tackling the war with Great Britain, declared inmid-June 1779;
the Junta duly came up with ten resources or measures.12 If any importance
can be given to the number and order of the proposed measures, tax hikes
came in last. To ýnance this war the Junta proposed the establishment of
10. The best guide to the nature of Spanish absolutism is still the work of P. Fernández,
1992.
11. Dictamen del conde de Floridablanca sobre la forma de aumentar las rentas
provinciales, issued on 15 May 1784. AHN (Archivo Histórico Nacional), Estado,
Leg. (number of legajo) 238.
12. This Junta de Medios also features as Consejo Particular de Medios. Its
documentation in AHN, Consejos, Leg. 5379.
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“gratuitous” donations, lotteries, life annuity funds in the Americas and
diverse sales of titles, jobs, encomiendas (grant of right to tributes and
revenue) and graces in the Americas and in a signiýcant ninth and tenth
place, a 33% increase in the Rentas Provinciales “of Castile and Aragon”
and a tax on spirits and liqueurs. Signiýcantly, another Junta de Medios
held in late June 1779 did not even mention tax increases.13 It would seem
that the government was working from the idea that any warfare-ýnancing
resource was valid providing it involved no tax increases.
The Secretario de Estado’s written thought must have been a deep-
seated maxim of Charles III’s government, because the most surprising
aspect of this whole tax-hike issue is precisely how long it took for the
government to bring it in. Although the war began in June 1779, the
government did not give the tax-hike order until mid-November of this year.
This delay does not seem logical in the circumstances, especially in view of
the fact the revenue was likely to take some time to ýlter through the system.
The money resulting from the tax increase would not reach the state’s
coffers until one year after the outbreak of war. This delay contrasts sharply
with the extraordinary legislative þeet-footedness shown by the opposing
sovereign George III, who, at the very moment of declaring war ordered
increases in a host of taxes.14 This national difference suggests a differing
sensitivity towards the role of taxes as a warfare-ýnancing medium.
Everything would seem to suggest that the Spanish government was
conýdent that the taxation option would not be necessary if the military
strategy came out well, seeking to defeat Great Britain by this same summer
of 1779. To this end all military effort had concentrated on building up a
huge navy to attack the British Isles directly together with the French þeet,
followed by an invasion and a rapid end to proceedings.15 The failure of
this strategy forced the authorities to ply its loins for a long war and seek
more ýnancing sources. Up to that time the war-ýnancing method had been
the traditional one of riþing all deposits of public funds right round the
13. The ýrst Junta de Medios in 1779 was made up by the secretario del despacho de
Hacienda, Miguel Múzquiz, the governor of the Consejo de Hacienda, Pedro Rodríguez
Campomanes, the Secretario de Estado, Conde de Floridablanca, the Abbot Pico, Andrés
Barcia, ýve representatives of the realm and the procurador general of the realm. Reference
is made to the two juntas in J. CANGA, 1968, p. 24. The proceedings of this Junta in AHN,
Consejos, Leg. 5380.
14. S. CONWAY, 2007, p. 45-68.
15. On the advantages Spain would glean from a “quick end to the war”, such as the
invasion of Great Britain, see the thoughts of Floridablanca as expressed to Aranda (Spanish
ambassador in Paris) AHN, Estado, Leg. 4218.
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country. These pools of savings, with the government’s established right to
tap into them, had defrayed Spain’s various conþicts since 1774 (Moroccan
attack on the North African strongholds, expedition to Algeria in 1775 and
to Río de la Plata in 1776) but the source was now running dry. Whether
because the government conýdently expected the war to be over quickly or
preferred other ýnancing sources and mistrusted the taxation option, the
truth is that Charles III’s government dallied six months over the tax hike.
Recent historical experience must have taught them that that the revenue
would be slow to come in and they were also perfectly aware that the Real
Hacienda was now entering a war with its traditional ýnancing source
exhausted, so the decision to put back the tax hike can be accounted for
only by the government’s chariness of a ýscal change. This is borne out by
the government’s subsequent sense of its obligation to justify the change.
2. The search for legitimacy
Charles III, as an absolute monarch, had all the necessary sovereignty,
legitimacy and authority to decree an increase in tax rates. In theory, neither
the monarch nor his government was bound to ask any other institution to
vouchsafe this decision or negotiate its enforcement. Charles III was much
freer than his rival George III when it came to changing his subjects’ taxation
situation. Spain was still far from being a “checked leviathan”, whereas the
United Kingdom was showing the ýrst signs of being so.16 Despite these
advantages, the government’s political practice was surprisingly coy, falling
within parameters of behaviour that we might dub “ýscal paternalism”.
For whatever reason, and despite the delay, the government decided to act
with notable precautions, to forestall a taxpayer backlash, and bent over
backwards to soften the impact of this tax hike. As we will soon see, this
tax increase was presented as an exceptional measure and in fact was called
in the documentation “Extraordinary”.17
16. On the development of control mechanisms over the state’s legislative activity and
its capacity of drawing up ýscal and ýnancial policies, see J. HOPPIT, 2002, p. 267-294. Julian
Hoppit cites precisely the war against the Thirteen Colonies in 1780 as the starting point of
an extraordinary development of these mechanisms, p. 291. Stephen Conway, however, has
shown that parliament’s degree of control over taxes for military spending was less than
had been previously supposed; see S. CONWAY, 2007, p. 47. The crux was really to secure the
consensus and support of the elites; see R. HARDING, 2007, p. 31-50.
17. To refer to this tax hike the Secretaría de Hacienda used the term “Extraordinary
Contribution” from the word go and this usage was then taken up by all involved institutions
and ofýcials.
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For some reason Charles III’s government wanted to avoid appearing
before “public opinion” as a despotic and arbitrary government. In a
calculated and systematic way he continually resorted to a justiýcatory
rhetoric to back up his decision andmuster grassroots support and legitimacy.
The very decree that imposed the one-third hike in Rentas Provincialeswas
a notable exercise of political justiýcation, based on overriding arguments
of pressing needs, justice and fairness.18 The rhetorical intent is obvious
and the words therefore need to be read with a pinch of salt. Nonetheless,
the arguments used to take on a special signiýcance if we bear in mind the
manner in which the tax hike was arranged and enforced.
The pressing needs referred to in the decree did not stem solely from
the war with the English, initiated over six months back. The decree also
invoked the backlog of costs built up since the “costly expeditions to Africa
and the Americas”. By stressing the longer timeframe of the urgency the
government was trying to emphasise the king’s ongoing fund-raising effort
up to that time, without falling back on the option of tax increases. This
highlighted the state’s paternalistic function of protecting its subjects at no
cost to them and also brought out both the inevitability and justice of this
rise now that all the state’s other resources had been milked dry.
The writers of this document openly tabled the justice of this tax
increase because, in the government’s view, the war undertaken was
intrinsically just too. The English and the English alone, it was argued,
were the warmongers here, since they had been provoking the Spanish
and attacking “my American domains since 1770”, which, as he expressly
acknowledged, imperilled the possessions of both worlds and “the goods
and trade of my beloved subjects”. By using this argument the government
was presenting the conþict to taxpayers as a defensive rather than offensive
war; it was just to defend oneself, especially when what was at stake was
the monarchy’s most coveted possession: its colonies. This rhetoric is very
different from the English government’s tax-hike justiýcation oratory, which
preferred to coax taxpayers into supporting an expansive project that would
boost economic opportunities.19 An all-in-this-together political rhetoric
was not really on the cards in the Spanish case.
Once the justiceof thiswarhadbeenestablished, theSpanishgovernment
then had to detail how it would be kept up and who by. Charles III’s
18. A copy of the decree,MiguelMúzquiz, San Lorenzo, 17-11-1779, en AHN, Hacienda,
Libro 8031, f. 499-500.
19. S. CONWAY, 2006.
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government expressly declared in this decree that it behoved the government
itself to seek warfare-funding resources, which would be done if possible
without increasing the tax burden. The principle of taxes only as a last-ditch
effort was therefore made explicit right from the word go. The sequence here
is crucial. It is in this characteristic trait that the Spanish government stands
out from other European countries, where raising taxes was the ýrst thing
done after declaring war because state creditworthiness was guaranteed
(both for attracting funds and backing up the issue of public debt).20 Quite
on the contrary, in all the conþicts during Charles III’s reign (Seven Year’s
War and post-1774 conþicts) tax rises were the last-ditch measure when the
state’s liquid resources and savings had run out.21 As Charles III expressly
recognised to justify the last-ditch effort of asking taxpayers to help ýnance
the war: “I ýnd myself in the inexorable need of asking my countrymen for
help after saving them from any encumbrance over many years”. Probably
this was what Charles III’s government really thought.
This self-justiýcatory rhetoric reached its peak with the arguments
brandished to keep both arbitrista thinkers and taxpayers themselves
happy: demonstrating unequivocally that the tax would be enforced in a
just and even-handed way (a crucial argument to glean a certain public
consensus and second-guess the government’s own legitimacy). For a start
the tax was given a time limit; it would be enforced only during 1780. This
time limit is important because this hike has traditionally been presented
as an opportunity for the government to reform the Rentas Provinciales,
a process that eventually led to Lerena’s 1785 reform.22 In fact this decree
shows that the new tax was born with an expiry date. If the tax was then
renewed this was always on the express condition of a one-year extension to
its term, which called for a new justiýcation and a new commitment from
Charles III’s government.23 In fact, once the war had ended, the state did not
extend the tax term anew. At least from the public-ýnance point of view,
20. This way of addressing the funding problem stands out for its originality when
compared with the approaches elsewhere in Europe; see M. SONENSCHER, 2007.
21. As during the Seven Year’s War, Charles’s government preferred to tap into state
“savings” in the Real Depósito before increasing tax rates (see A. GONZÁLEZ ENCISO, 2006,
p. 187) or even asking for donations for civil and ecclesiastical bodies (see J. ANDRÉS-
GALLEGO, 2003, p. 159).
22. As Pegerto Saavedra has suggested, the one-third increase in these taxes was a
fortunate ýrst step, subsequently rounded out by Lerena’s 1785 reform. P. SAAVEDRA, 2007,
p. 843. For more information on Lerena’s reform see A. GONZÁLEZ ENCISO, 2009, p. 249-268.
23. The tax-hike renewal orders in Madrid, 24-12-1780, AGS, SSH, Leg. 1741 and 21-11-
1781 in AGS, SSH, Leg. 1742 and 27-11-1782 in AGS, SSH, Leg. 1744
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this revocation was also illogical, because it was precisely with the return of
peace that the state’s debts and payment defaults ganged up most urgently.
Political denial of warfare-fuelled ýnancial urgencies can best be
understood from a paternalistic vision of politics. This at least was the
interpretation made by the Archbishop of Granada when, after the end
of the war, he weighed up the deýnitive revocation of a tax that had been
renewed for yearly terms since late 1779. In an equally paternalistic tone he
opined that revocation of the Extraordinaria was a show of
“your majesty’s love of his subjects, whose deft policies now surprise us anew
with another public beneýt comparable only to the state’s generous pardon of one
third in your taxpayers’ burden, imposed thereon only due to the urgencies of war
and much to the chagrin of your compassionate heart.”24
This limited term of the new tax is yet another feature that stands
out from the ýscal measures adopted by the enemy, where the new taxes
ended up grafted for good on the ýscal structure, insofar as they had no time
limit and were tied in with the need of paying off the public debt built up
during the war.25 Both governments, in other words, made tax changes but
Charles III’s was not brought in at the start of the war and was decreed with
a built-in time limit.
Probably with the same legitimacy-seeking purpose, the Spanish
government accompanied the Extraordinaria’s time limit with another even
more decisive public-opinion-wooing trait: the new tax’s even-handedness.
Contradictory as it may seem, Charles III’s despotic government felt the
need to present the tax change as fair and just. Fiscal inequality had been
one of the main gripes of the proyectistas and politicians of the time in
their demands for tax reforms. These authors tended to cite the Rentas
Provinciales as the most extreme example of this lopsidedness, so the
principle of taxation fairness was almost bound de rigor to pop up in the
decree. According to the orders of the Secretaría de Hacienda, the new tax
would be enforced throughout the whole of Spain rather than just in the
crown of Castile. This meant that the Extraordinaria Contribución would
be extended to all the taxpayers of the Crown of Aragon too, their own
provincial taxes, the Equivalentes, being increased by exactly the same
proportion. This geographical extension meant that this new tax burden
24. Granada, 26-12-1783, AGS, SSH, Leg. 1744.
25. On the deýnitive incorporation of Great Britain’s war-generated taxes into the ýscal
structure, see P. K. O’BRIEN, 2007, p. 295-356.
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would be truly “national”, an extremely important development in Spain’s
eighteenth-century taxation system.26
By bringing Aragonese taxpayers into the trawl of the new tax, the
state killed two birds with one stone. Until now the liabilities of Aragon’s tax
payers had never been revised in the whole century, so they had gradually
built up a privileged position; this new tax partly put paid to that. Secondly,
it helped to justify the tax to Castilian taxpayers. Despite this political
decision, however, the nationwide extension of the scope of this tax was not
accompanied by a new nationwide collection arrangement. This oversight
led to grave inequalities and problems that the state had to solve on a seat-
of-the-pants basis.
Any tax that aims at even-handedness and fairness cannot afford to
leave out any group of taxpayers, or at least due arrangements have to be
made to charge them in another way. The decree therefore explained, to pre-
empt any grievances against privileged taxpayers, such as the church, that
these were exempt from the new tax for now because other “more efýcient”
taxes had been levied on them. In any case the decree by no means ruled
out including them within this tax later; indeed the Secretaría de Hacienda
was already working towards this end.27 The message was clear: all subjects
were to be charged alike in an effort to pre-empt taxpayer opposition and
seek a tacit consensus and legitimacy.
The Secretaría de Hacienda’s vaunted fairness and even-handedness
of the tax hike was reinforced with the argument that it would, to a certain
extent, be progressive: lower earners would not pay as much tax as higher
earners. An express declaration was in fact made of exclusion from the tax
of: “necessary items for feeding the poor”. In all likelihood the paternalist
rhetoric surrounding this tax-rise sought to emphasise its justice and
fairness. Perhaps Charles III’s government was even haunted by memories
of the recent popular uprisings suffered by the previous Secretario de
Hacienda. The Esquilache riots still loomed large; indeed they were an
express argument wielded by the Directores Generales de las Rentas
Provinciales in planning the revenue collection system for this new tax and
26. A. GONZÁLEZ ENCISO, 2003, p. 21-41.
27. The “gratuitous” and forced donations of the clergy have never received their
full due as a ýnancing arrangement, but in this particular war they made an appreciable
contribution. The 1780 church donation, for example, added up to over 12 million reales,
against the forecast ýgure of 36 million from the Extraordinaria Contribución. R. TORRES,
2015.
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also lay behind the felt need to justify, in Madrid’s case, the exemption of
some staples.28
Just as important as the manifest will to make sure everyone paid
their bit was the secure establishment of the revenue collection method. As
it later transpired, the government in fact feared that this new tax would
end up strengthening non-state-controlled revenue collection methods,
affecting the poorest taxpayers despite the spirit of the law. The government
knew and feared that uncontrolled head taxes (repartos/repartimientos)
and lump-sum payments (encabezamientos) or new consumer taxes could
have disastrous effects on local economies and the worst-off. Once more
the paternalist spirit shines through and the state allowed the towns to dip
into the surplus funds of Propios y Arbitrios (local land revenue) in the
local coffers. A subsequent instruction sent out to intendentes made the
situation even clearer: the reason for using the surplus ofPropios y Arbitrios
as a means of paying the new tax was “to avoid untoward encumbrance
of taxpayers”.29 A measure of this importance was possible due to the
institutional and administrative changes in local ýnance control brought in
by the monarchy since midway through the century. The state’s ostensible
intention in doing so had been to reduce the alarming local debt levels but
nobody was blind to the fact that the control systems established on local
income, expenditure and debts also allowed state authorities to keep track
of the resources available in Spanish towns and villages.30
Working from the state’s information on the actual ýnancial resources
at local level, the Secretario de Hacienda ascertained, at the end of 1777, that
local coffers contained a total of 62.5 million reales, of which 32.2 million
were in cash and the rest in outstanding credits.31 The Directores Generales
de Rentas had previously estimated revenue from the Extraordinaria
Contribución to be about 30.3 million reales, so it was assumed that local
coffers had more than enough to defray the new tax.32 The government’s
information to hand therefore prompted it to authorise – in reality to force –
towns and villages to use these resources to pay the tax rise. Nonetheless,
28. Sáez de Parayuelo and Juan Matías de Arozarena to Miguel Múzquiz, Madrid, 24-
11-1779, AGS, SSH, Leg. 2327.
29. Real Cédula 3-12-1779, AHN, Hacienda, libro 8031.
30. C. GARCÍA, 1996, p. 187.
31. AGS, SSH, Leg. 435.
32. Sáez de Parayuello and Juan Matías de Arozarena to Miguel Múzquiz, 24-11-1779,
AGS, SSH, Leg. 2327.
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there were presumably more reasons than merely a paternalist outlook urging
the state to authorise use of these local resources for payment of this tax.
If the overriding object of any ýscal policy was to raise the revenue as
quickly and efýciently as possible, Charles III’s government thought to do
so by conýscating the savings of local governments. The use of these local
resources, moreover, might help to dissuade local councils from taking out
loans to pay taxes, i.e., running up debts. Avoiding borrowing by concejos
had been precisely the main aim of the Bourbons’ local ýnance reforms. It
would therefore not seem reasonable for the state to give concejos full liberty
in deciding how to pay the new tax, i.e., the method, because this would have
involved the risk of Spain’s local councils running up more debt. In other
words, the state decreed a rise in taxes that was in fact a transfer of revenue.
By going about it this way the state was also pre-empting local councils
from creating new consumer taxes or head taxes to pay the Extraordinaria
Contribución, a practice that would end up spreading panic and discontent
among consumers and taxpayers. We would argue that the state had
plumped for a paternalist approach to taxation (limiting debt and damage to
consumers), although this measure does not cloak the arbitrariness implied
in this policy (shake up and control of local ýnances to dip into them at will
afterwards). The consequences of this disconcerting but understandable
way of conceiving taxation and ýnances ended up working against the state
itself in the revenue-collection process.
All the precautions taken to justify the hike in Rentas Provinciales
y Equivalente tell us that the government did have a certain sensitivity
towards any popular reaction to the enforcement thereof. Charles III’s
government to some extent reined in its own powers of absolute despotism
and arbitrariness. It probably did so due to fear of taxpayer reaction but the
truth is that the state made an effort to vouch for its own taxation legitimacy;
such second-guessing was absolutely unnecessary in light of its real powers.
3. The actual revenue-collection situation
Charles III’s caution and damage-limitation approach continued when
it came to making revenue-collection arrangements. To start with the tax-
hike decree was repeatedly put back for fear that the bad weather and
drought the country was currently suffering from would increase taxpayer
opposition. The government’s qualms even led it to halt distribution of the
already printed decree to regional authorities until such time as the weather
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might change, even though it had already been signed by the king.33 The
great problem for the government, however, lay in how to enforce the decree.
The overriding fear was that failure to make due provision for all possible
snags and drawbacks might bring the whole procedure grinding to a halt
due to complaints and suits brought by taxpayers; in the words of Miguel
Múzquiz: “You (Directores Generales de Rentas) will see the downpour
that is going to engulf the Finance Ministry”.34
The Secretaría de Hacienda saw the main problem to be coming up
with a clear deýnition of Rentas Provinciales before applying the 33%
increase thereto. This deýnition process was left up to the Directores
Generales de Rentas. After a painstaking analysis of the characteristics
of each tax making up the Provinciales, it was agreed to exclude some of
them.35 The directors were at pains to explain this exclusion since it implied
a reduction in the amount of revenue collected. Motley arguments were
offered ranging from economic effects that a certain tax might have on
economic activity,36 to any legal ceiling that might exist, as in the case of
situados, tercias or aguardiente.37 The patchy nature and trend of the taxes
making up the Rentas Provinciales seriously hindered the design of the
taxation policy, no matter how absolute the state’s powers might be. In all,
the costs of these excluded taxes was reckoned to trim 5.6 million reales
off the previously estimated 32 million revenue from the Extraordinaria
Contribución.38 Some idea of the importance of this reduction can be
33. “the day looked promising with heavily laden clouds but they were blown away
by the north wind at dusk and the night is still cloudless. Before publishing the decree we
deem it ýtting that it be held back until the end of the month, watching the weather reports
in the interim throughout the whole country to see if the drought is to continue”, Sáez del
Parayuelo to Múzquiz, Madrid 18-11-1779. AGS, SSH, Leg. 2327.
34. Múzquiz to Directores Generales de Rentas, 15-11-1779, AGS, SSH, Leg. 2327.
35. Exclusion was made of tercias (tithes), servicio ordinario (a property tax on
commoners collected in Castile), spirit tax, situado (money transfers), población de
Granada, sosa and barilla, quinto de la nieve (tax on the ice business), silk, extraction and
sugar.
36. Such was the case of the Granada silk revenue, where “any alteration might undo all
progress made in this highly appreciated business.” Directores Generales de Rentas, Juan
Matías de Arozarena and Sáez de Parayuelo to Miguel Múzquiz, 24-11-1779, AGS, SSH,
Leg. 2327.
37. “After your majesty’s transfer to them of the spirit tax.” Directores Generales de
Rentas, Juan Matías de Arozarena and Sáez de Parayuelo to Miguel Múzquiz, 24-11-1779,
AGS, SSH, Leg. 2327.
38. Directores Generales de Rentas, Juan Matías de Arozarena and Saez de Parayuelo
to Miguel Múzquiz, 24-11-1779, AGS, SSH, Leg. 2327. Datos de Madrid AGS, DGT, Inv. 16,
Guión 24, Leg. 49.
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gained by comparing this 5.6 million of excluded taxes with the 5 million to
be contributed by Catalonia for the Extraordinaria.





Rentas Equivalentes % % %
Real Contribución del Catastro
de Cataluña
15,210,457 11.9 5,070,146 14.0 20,280,603 12.4
Contribución Equivalente de
Valencia
8,285,346 6.5 2,597,747 7.2 10,883,093 6.7
Aragón 5,665,999 4.5 1,666,666 4.6 7,332,666 4.5
Talla general de Mallorca 481,882 0.4 160,627 0.4 642,509 0.4
Total Equivalentes 29,643,684 23.3 9,495,186 26.3 39,138,871 23.9
Rentas Provinciales 97,649,618 76.7 26,646,735 73.7 124,296,353 76.1
Total 127,293,302 100 36,141,921 100 163,435,224 100
77.9 22.1 100
Source. AGS, SSH, lg. 999.
This was not the only limit the government imposed on itself and,
indeed, there were more exceptions. The most important was the case of
Madrid, whose Rentas Provinciales were farmed out to the Cinco Gremios
Mayores. In Madrid the government’s fear of any grassroots reaction to
a change in the tax structure was particularly evident. With memories of
the Esquilache riot still vivid in its mind,39 the government clearly pleaded
caution: “equivalent measures with no risk of inciting popular unrest should
be sought”.40 To hammer home this point it was decided that the exceptional
methods would be enforced only in the inner city, with general Rentas
Provinciales being applied to the province of Madrid as a whole. The
Gremios were authorised to levy special consumer charges, but once again
with the caveat that “the poorer people and tradesmen of Madrid should not
see their staples threatened by the Extraordinaria Contribución”.41 In the
end the Gremios were allowed to levy the charge only on cocoa, wine, wax,
39. Indeed the taxation-fuelled unrest against Esquilache stemmed partly from the
attempts made since 1762 to hike up the Rentas Provinciales J. ANDRÉS-GALLEGO, 2003,
p. 185.
40. Directores Generales de Rentas, Juan Matías de Arozarena and Sáez de Parayuelo
to Miguel Múzquiz, 24-11-1779, AGS, SSH, Leg. 2327.
41. Miguel Múzquiz to Directores Generales de Rentas, Palacio, 20-12-1779, AGS,
DGR-II, Leg. 610.
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sugar and textiles on the grounds that “the poorer people canmostly eschew
such goods and the charge therefore encumbers more so the better off who
can afford same”.42 A calculation was also made to ensure that the extra
tax should be collected only until adding up to a one-third increase and
should not be prolonged beyond the liability established for the inner city of
Madrid (1.9 million reales de vellón). In other words, instead of levying the
tax where it was likeliest to contribute most, such as a consumer-intensive
built-up area, equity with the rest of the realm was the overriding motive, to
avoid upsetting Madrid residents. This was the exact opposite procedure to
the English, who tended to levy their taxes where business and demand for
goods was highest. Once more, Charles III’s government shifted uneasily
between a love and dread of its subjects, showing special sensitivity towards
its Madrid subjects.
Once a deýnition has been made of how much was to be raked in with
the new tax, i.e., about 36 million reales de vellón in the whole of Spain,
arrangements were then made for transferring the money, as previously
agreed, from the local authorities to the Real Hacienda. The problem for
the state was how quick this revenue could be obtained, with the words
“winning time” continually featuring in the Secretaría de Hacienda’s
correspondence.43 The state was really obsessed with this issue of speed.
As Patrick O’Brien has shown, the true ýnancial challenge of all European
governments was not to create new taxes but to cut the revenue-receiving
cost and time and ipso facto increase the efýciency of the whole operation.44
We would argue that if Charles III’s government turned to Rentas
Provinciales for the biggest war-ýnancing tax increase, this was hardly on
the grounds of its being the easiest revenue to bring in. Quite on the contrary,
it was in fact the most time-consuming revenue collecting tax of all.45 The
real reason for doing so must have been that it glimpsed the best possibility
of cloaking the revenue-transfer sleight of hand that was intended, above
all, to solve the grave problem of revenue-collecting tardiness in the new
taxes. Precisely in an instruction prior to the tax-hike order it was indicated
that the decision had been taken to pay the Extraordinaria Contribución
42. Miguel Múzquiz to Consejo de Castilla, Madrid, 20-12-1779, AGS, DGR-II,
Leg. 610.
43. Many examples in AGS, DGR-II, Leg. 610.
44. P. K. O’BRIEN, 2006, p. 341-363.
45. See the comparison of the revenue collection speed in various royal taxes (Tobacco,
General, Lanas (wool revenue), Salinas (salt revenue), Provinciales and Bula de Cruzada
(indulgences)) in three years (1762, 1772 and 1782), see R. TORRES, 2015, p. 216-217.
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with the leftovers of the Propios y Arbitrios because this was conducive to
“sooner and more effective enforcement of a great part of this service”.46
In our judgement the war and associated urgency gave the pretext and
chance for masquerading a transfer of funds from local authorities to the
king’s coffers. In all likelihood war was the excuse and the alibi was ýscal
paternalism, but the way the whole revenue collection process was arranged
raises the question of whether it in fact amounted to a clear subjection of
local funds to the ýnancial interests of the state.
Charles III’s government could call above all on two key factors to
make sure the local council’s savings were spent perforce on payment of the
“ExtraordinariaContribución”. Firstly the systemof intendentes and secondly
a long track record of growing control over local treasuries. Since 1760 there
had been a local accounts watchdog body called Contaduría General de
Propios y Arbitrios, albeit closely watched over in its turn by the Consejo
de Castilla, because the Secretaría de Hacienda preferred to place his trust
in the intendentes.47 The Consejo de Castilla’s annual stream of information
helped to keep a constant track of the money available at local level. In truth
these accounts procedures were not totally accurate, designed as they were
to þaunt the “progress” being made in the Bourbon’s reformist, local-debt-
reduction policies. In time this sparked off the protests of the Secretaría de
Hacienda who wanted to know how much was effectively being held in local
treasuries.48 After a ýerce clash with the Consejo de Castilla, the Secretaría
de Hacienda ýnally found out that the Consejo’s much-vaunted 347.6 million
reales de vellón as “cumulative proýt since 1760” from the towns of the
whole of Spain, in fact boiled down to only 68 million reales de vellón. Even
these were only theoretically available because part thereof corresponded to
local debt. The study to ýnd out how much the Secretaría de Hacienda could
actually call on as ready cash threw up the ýnal ýgure of 37.5 million reales
de vellón. It is a striking coincidence that this resulting ýgure should tally so
closely with the 36.1 million reales de vellón that the government hoped to
glean from the “Extraordinaria Contribución”.
If the government’s ýnal intention was to effect a revenue transfer and
thus avoid any increase in the tax burden (apart from the “well-off” Madrid
classes), it all came to naught in the end.
46. Real Cédula 3-12-1779, AHN, Hacienda, libro 8031.
47. C. GARCÍA, 1996, p. 195.
48. This follows from the correspondence between Miguel Múzquiz and Manuel
Becerra, Comptroller of Propios y Arbitrios, from 1777 onwards and in the months running
up to the November 1779 decree, AGS, SSH, Leg. 80.
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The government set up a “consejo particular” within the Consejo
de Castilla, closely watched over by the Secretaría de Hacienda, with the
express remit of urgently dealing with any doubts thrown up by authorities
or taxpayers “as quickly as possible and with overriding preference to any
other business.”49 All the information generated was supposed to help the
treasurer general, in liaison with the intendentes, to supervise the circulation
of available capital.50 In fact, however, what the Real Hacienda was quickly
þooded with was not local savings but rather intendentes’ reports warning
of the non-existence of the ostensibly-available capital and asking for an
extension of the payment deadline. From Barcelona the Barón de la Linde
insisted on a three-fold phase in of the Equivalente payment, as had always
been the custom with the Catastro, the provincial tax of Catalonia. The tax
hike and immediate payment thereof as decreed, explained the intendente
of Catalonia, could not be done “without alteration thereof in this case, not
only in due accordance with the agreed rules for payment of the Catastro
but also because it would be impossible for towns and villages to come
up with the extra payment”. Múzquiz’s response was a forthright no: “the
third increase is to be enforced on the whole Catastro as on the whole
Contribución de Aragón, Equivalente de Valencia and Talla en Mallorca,
without the exception that (you) have mistakenly assumed”.51 The important
point for the minister here was not the “how much” but “when,” i.e., the
revenue collection speed. But the intendentes had already given warning
of the real situation, that the money was not in fact available in the amount
assumed by the Consejo de Castilla or the Secretaría de Hacienda. The
implicit objective of a swift transfer of funds from local authorities to
central government was þoundering by now, and therewith any hope of a
burden-free tax hike.
In January 1780 the worst fears came true. All the involved authorities
agreed that the money did not exist in local councils; the Directores
Generales de Rentas ýnal conclusion after the avalanche of negative reports
was: “the Propios surplus wrongly supposed to exist by the respective
Contadurías has in fact been unforthcoming in many towns and villages”.
The Secretaría de Hacienda’s response, telling intendentes to up the
pressure on local councils to come up with the money, was unavailing. The
Directores themselves pointed out “this seldom serves any purpose other
49. On 24 November the Secretaría de Hacienda ordered the Consejo de Castilla to set
up with some urgency a “Consejo Particular”; the correspondence with the Secretaría de
Hacienda in AGS, SSH, Leg. 435.
50. On the coordinating role of the treasurers general, see R. TORRES, 2012.
51. Barón de la Linde to Múzquiz, Barcelona 8-12-1779. Múzquiz to Linde, Madrid 22-
12-1779, AGS, SSH, Leg. 999.
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than making it even more difýcult for towns and taxpayers to comply.”52 In
the words of the intendente of Valencia, no one was saying that the accounts
presented to the Consejo de Castilla or intendentes were false; it was just
that the money, physically, was not there: “the funds do not now exist” and
that “those surpluses were make-believe”.53 The intendente of Catalonia
came to the selfsame conclusion: “the ostensible surpluses, in most towns,
do not actually exist in the coffers”.54
The situation was practically the same throughout the whole of Spain.
The money was non-existent, as it turned out, because it had been spent on
urgencies, unforeseen expenses or even expenses authorised by the Consejo
de Castilla but then left out of the accounts sent to Madrid. Cádiz declared
itself to be incapable of paying its Extraordinaria due of 1,474,193 reales
because, with the permission of the Consejo de Castilla, it had invested
all the 1778 and 1779 surpluses in street-cleaning and -paving work.55
Vélez Málaga had lent its 1778 surpluses to the “local harvesters of wine,
raisins, almonds, ýgs, lemons and oranges” to promote their production
and exportation.56 Similarly, Seville had already committed its present and
future surpluses. To offset the effects of the poor harvest of 1779 the city
had borrowed 120,000 pesos from local merchants to import grain. To pay
off this loan, which had been authorised by the Consejo de Castilla, Seville
had mortgaged precisely the yield of two dehesas and all the future revenue
surpluses. The city was now in a cleft stick. If it ceased to pay off the loan, in
order to meet its Extraordinaria commitments, this would entail breach of
contract, ruling out any similar recourse in the future and also, they argued,
driving up wheat prices.57 Such examples are endless.
The attempt to control local ýnances had apparently been all in
vain. The problems that had urged the Bourbons to step in do not seem
to have changed the local ýnance situation much. Corruption, uncontrolled
borrowing or fanciful accounting began to come to light in all the reports
explaining the lack of money. In some cases the intendentes began to blame
the “juntas municipales” for having pulled the wool over the authorities’
52. Directores Generales de Rentas to Múzquiz, 17-10-1780. AGS, DGR-II, Leg. 610.
53. Manuel Martínez de Irujo to Pedro Francisco de Pueyo, Valencia 29-12-1779, AGS,
SSH, Leg. 999.
54. Barón de la Linde to Miguel Múzquiz, Barcelona 11-12-1779, AGS, SSH, Leg. 999.
55. Ayuntamiento de Cádiz 16-2-1780, AGS, SSH, Leg. 1739.
56. Autorización del Consejo de Castilla, Madrid 7-5-1778, AGS, SSH, Leg. 1739.
57. Francisco Antonio Domezain to Miguel Múzquiz, Seville 15-12-1779, AGS, SSH,
Leg. 1741.
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eyes, not only in the routine accounts but also in one-off inspections. The
intendente of Granada claimed he could come up with evidence proving
that after
“having checked (by secret denouncements) several local treasuries once, twice or
three times in the course of ýfteen days … that in search of short term loans they
get the scribe to record existence of funds in the coffers that are in fact removed
and paid to the owner thereof... whereby they are turned into private business of
the Junta auditors, and this contagion runs rife through all provinces.” 58
The upshot of this actual situation of local ýnances was that money
earmarked for payment of the “Extraordinaria Contribución” did not
reach the royal coffers with the speed or ease required. A transfer that was
expected to take a few days dragged on much longer. By mid-February
only ten percent, 3.2 million reales, had been paid over and it was not until
January 1782 that all was paid off.59
The non-existence of these local surpluses and the long-drawn out
payment process speak volumes about the true nature of the Bourbons’
ýscal policy. This crushing failure forced the government to change tack.
It allowed the local councils to choose their own way of paying over the
sum due, even by setting up new local taxes. This ran completely counter
to its efforts up to that time to exert greater control over local ýnances. Any
paternalist intent was overridden by bleak reality.
Frommid-March 1780, at ýrst timidly and then openly, the government
passed on instructions to the “consejo particular” for it to accept any type
of tax or debt proposed by the ayuntamientos. The catalogue of measures
adopted by towns and villages to meet this “Extraordinaria” payment
swelled endlessly: hiring of ýshing rights in the River Tormes,60 exporting
of sosa and barilla in Cartagena,61 or, to take one more example, bullýghting
in Seville.62 The most frequent recourse however, in country towns, was the
ploughing of new arable land and the use of funds or sale of cereals and
58. Antonio Carrillo de Mendoza to Miguel Múzquiz, Granada 24-12-1779. AGS, SSH,
Leg. 1739.
59. We have used the “estado de cobranza” (charge statement) closest to the end of the
month. AGS, SSH, Leg. 1739 and 1740.
60. Por la villa de Bohoyo, provincia de Ciudad Rodrigo, Consejo to Múzquiz, 14-7-
1781, AGS, SSH, Leg. 1741.
61. Consejo to Múzquiz, 26-6-1781. AGS, SSH, Leg. 1741.
62. The intendente dealt with Seville’s request to raise funds for paying the
“Extraordinaria” by holding 8 bullýghts “due to the locals’ bent for ýestas of this type”,
Seville, 16-8-1782, AGS, SSH, Leg. 1742. In the end only 4 bullýghts were authorised.
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money from the pósitos (local grain stores)63 while cities tended to turn
to public debt or levy taxes on wine and spirits. Each case was pretty sui
generis, however, revealing local councils of that time to have a whole host
of other functions besides serving local residents. Take the case of Lérida,
which asked the “Consejo Particular” for permission to pay the one-third
increase under the Catastro, 61,379 reales, from the city’s bridge toll fund
(peazgo), since it had no Propios (local revenue-generating assets) and “no
other means of coming up with the money”.64 The intendente of Catalonia
and Secretario de Guerra, Conde de Ricla, supported the city’s request,
because the toll fund also served for city fortiýcation work, but Miguel
Múzquiz’s response, written in his own hand, was forthright: “his majesty
considered it to be more urgent to pay the third part of the extraordinary
contribution than extending the city’s bridge”.65 Quite clearly the political
discourse had shifted.
As the war dragged on, more and more resources were needed and the
government, þying in the teeth of its own announcements, decided to extend
the “Extraordinaria” for one year more during 1781,66 this measure then
being repeated in subsequent years for as long as the war lasted.67 Although
it was a mere extension, the Secretaría de Hacienda deemed it ýtting to
phase in changes in the revenue-collecting arrangements, learning directly
from the lessons of the ýrst year of enforcement of the “Extraordinaria”.
For a start the self-legitimising rhetoric of 1779 was now toned right
down. The Secretaría de Hacienda devoted most of its extension order to
explaining revenue-collection arrangements, now quite different. The state
now showed more þexibility in accepting means of payment. It continued to
recommend that local councils should pay the contribution from the Propios
63. Witness the town of Arévalo, which declared that it had no surpluses to pay the
“Extraordinaria Contribución”, even though its quota was a modest sum of 35,555 reales.
Neither could it raise this sum from local residents, “most of whom are humble day
labourers”. The only option left was to obtain permission for taking this sum from its pósito
(grain store), which at that moment had 290,000 reales in cash and 7,000 anegas of wheat,
Arevalo, 10-4-1780, AGS, SSH, Leg. 1739.
64. The right of peazgo had been a propio (local revenue-generating asset) of the city of
Lérida since 1432; in 1642 the decision was taken to spend this revenue henceforth on city
fortiýcation work. Although, like other towns and villages of the monarchy, it was ordered
to regulate its propios in 1766, this was never in fact done, partly because it came to be
tapped into directly “for reserved warfare resources”. The proceedings are kept in AGS,
SSH, Leg. 999.
65. Miguel Múzquiz to Conde de Ricla, Madrid 6-4-1780, AGS, SSH, Leg. 999.
66. RO 27-12-1780, AGS, DGR-II, Leg. 610.
67. The last extension on 27-12-1782 for the year 1783 in AGS, SSH, Leg. 1744.
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y Arbitrios surplus but left open the possibility of the council taking up new
loans or levying new taxes. The state even countenanced the possibility of
inter-council loans “on a payback basis”, against the surety of such new
taxes as may be levied. As for the type of taxes, there was now no limit,
barring the catch-all recommendation that councils “should give preference
to measures that stimulate arable and livestock farming such as bringing
new land under the plough, pastureland enclosures and other of similar ilk
that do not impinge on commonland rights”.68 Wine and spirit taxes were
also recommended, on the grounds that “these are by no means staples and
excessive use therefore should rather be discouraged”. Nonetheless, the
Secretaría de Hacienda left it up to the towns to make such tax proposals
as they deemed ýtting in each case, always on condition of avoiding poll
taxes and not “overtaxing the staples of the poor”. Lastly, the Secretaría de
Hacienda made a pointed reminder about the need of rapid payment and
directly blamed payment delays on the councils’ debtors, asking for greater
harshness to be used against them.
But the most telling measure of the extension order, in terms of
reþecting the change in the government’s outlook, was state authorisation
of a de facto suspension of payments by councils of the whole of Spain. The
Secretaría de Hacienda considered that, with the aim of pre-empting any
head taxes and in the interests of “the Real Hacienda receiving as soon as
possible the one-third increase in Rentas Provinciales o su Equivalente” it
would be ýtting for the local authorities to cease forthwith to pay back censos
(redemptions in fact being compulsory under the regulation approved by the
Consejo de Castilla) or to pay historical debts or “any debt whatsoever and
even the execution of agreed construction work, if not yet begun or, if so,
if it can now be suspended without causing grave damage to anyone”. This
freeze on debt payments and cancellation of public work69 was granted only
for one year “being suspended for now and no further than the year 1781”.70
It goes without saying by now, however, that this suspension of payments
was extended too in later years, in the new extensions, and right up to the
end of the war. The state did not seem willing to wield the same justice
68. Miguel Múzquiz, Madrid 27-12-1780, AGS, DGR, II, Leg. 610.
69. There are many examples of suspension of public works. Witness the paving of the
streets of Palencia, with the suggestion that the 39-maravedi levy on wine pitchers should
now be spent on the Extraordinaria, even at the cost of suspending the construction work.
This proposal was immediately approved by theConsejo, which deemed it to be “very ýtting
that all construction work be suspended, even if already begun”, and that the exception of
avoiding grave damage “does not apply to the ceasing of paving work”, Consejo 12-5-1781,
AGS, SSH, Leg. 1741.
70. Sundry circulars of Manuel Becerra, 11-1-1781 and 27-1-1781, AGS, SSH, Leg. 999.
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against council debtors as against their creditors. The government gave
breathing space to local treasuries and also improved revenue-collection
prospects, but these debt payment defaults must surely have undermined
local authorities’ creditworthiness in the search for new lenders later.
With these extensions the government had handed over the whole
ýscal initiative to the local councils. The problem for the latter was that
their chances of increasing the local tax trawl dwindled as the war dragged
on and demand, concomitantly, fell. In the end most towns had no option
but to fall back on head taxes and borrowing, i.e., just what the government
had initially wished to avoid. The revenue-collection initiative had ýnally
been left in the hands of local councillors. The state, in the end, had to give
up on its efýciency drive just to make sure the money came in anyhow.
From the warfare funding point of view it was a pyrrhic victory. For local
ýnances, however, it was a severe blow that led to higher borrowing levels,
a forfeiture of creditworthiness and a reduction in taxable demand. The
one and only positive feature in all this was the increase in arable land
and therewith the perpetuation of a productive and ýscal model based on
expansive agriculture.71
Figure 1. Cumulative monthly revenue of the “Extraordinaria Contribución”
by the 22 provinces of Castile
Source. AGS, SSH, Leg. 1739 to 1744.
71. It is difýcult to calculate the amount of new land brought under the plough but there
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Some idea of the local difýculties in meeting this “Extraordinaria
Contribución” can be gained from the payment backlogs, building up as
time went on. By the end of 1780, for example, the 22 provinces of Castile
had paid over to the state 86% of their “Extraordinaria” dues for this year
(31,153,710), the rest being paid backdated in later years. This payment
percentage fell in the following years; in 1781 only 69% of the sum due
was actually paid; in 1782 62.9% and in 1783 only 52%. This decreasing
ability to pay the “Extraordinaria” on time meant a build-up of payment
defaults and delays. The “Extraordinaria” must without doubt have become
an increasingly heavy burden for local towns and taxpayers. In other words
the state not only failed in its attempt to spare taxpayers but even failed to
raise the resources it needed quickly enough, ceasing to receive them at all
as the conþict wore on.
*
A study of the century’s biggest tax hike sheds light on the Spanish
absolutist state’s taxation policy. The measure was originally taken on the
grounds that it would be an efýcient warfare-ýnancing method. The whole
revenue-collection arrangement was steeped through in ýscal paternalism,
aiming to head off the least social unrest. The government second-guessed
its own legitimacy and considered it essential for the revenue not to come
straight from taxpayers’ pockets. For the government of Charles III this tax
rise was to be nothing more than a quick and temporary transfer of funds
from local coffers to the Real Hacienda. The problems cropped up when the
state realised it could not tap into local funds with impunity and above all
that they did not exist in the amounts expected beforehand. Pressing needs
and the actual situation of local ýnances forced the state to renege on its
intentions and paternalistic rhetoric, leaving the solution of the problem up
to the councils. The state had to accept any proposed measure, including
even those ideas it had most vigorously opposed in previous decades,
such as upping the local borrowing rate. In the end the state obtained the
revenue it wanted but at the cost of ditching a good part of the reformist and
interventionist policy pursued hitherto. The absolutist state, in other words,
did not have the institutional control for modifying its taxation policy at
will but the poverty of the country and of its subjects and the love and fear
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